The present regulatory climate has led to increasing demands for scientists to attest to the predictive reliability of numerical simulation models used to help set public policy, a process frequently referred to as model validation. But 
the environment thus enjoy the benefit of widespread agreement about the basic harmfulness of the substance being regulated. (This is not to say that the consensus was not hardwon: In the 1920s and 1930s, most health professionals opposed banning lead in gasoline [1, 2] ).
The political and scientific consensus on the harmfulness of lead stands in contrast to other recent debates in environmental health and safety-nuclear power, polyvinyl chloride, radon gas, to name a few-in which there have been heated and even bitter disagreements among government agencies, industrial organizations, labor unions, and citizens' groups as to the significance of the purported harms (6) . In these cases, debates have arisen in part because of the difficulty of documenting exposure levels (thus proving harm) in nonoccupational settings. Such settings typically involve low-level exposures whose clinical effects may be difficult to discern and characteristically emerge only after considerable time. In addition, the harmful materials may not themselves reside in the body and therefore cannot be directly measured. Under such circumstances, scientific uncertainty is inevitable. Low-level radiation is a case in point. Because radiation does not reside in the bloodstream, it is difficult to document exposures in uncontrolled settings, and impossible to prove that low-level exposure caused a particular affliction in a particular individual. Such proofs must rely on statistical regularities in longitudinal studies of populations. In contrast, it is relatively easy to document who has been affected by lead: blood lead levels are measurable and the clinical effects of toxicity are readily discernible (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) . In principle, therefore, it should be a comparatively straightforward task to set legal limits for lead in the environment.
In practice, however, the problem of setting regulatory standards for lead has been complicated by the growing recognition that very low levels of lead exposure may not be safe as previously assumed (2, 3, (12) (13) (14) . The (29) . In essence, such models are trying to "predict the unpredictable" (30) . Bankes (30) and Oreskes (32, 33) , in a discussion of computer models in the earth sciences, note that the criteria outlined above-measurability, accessibility, and temporal and spatial invariance-are precisely those features typically lacking in the natural systems that scientists are increasingly exploring with computer models. The reason is evident: If a physical situation fully satisfied these criteria, there would be little need for a numerical simulation. It could be described, in most cases, with a small number of deterministic equations. Computer models are needed and have become increasingly common in the natural sciences precisely because scientists are grappling with complex systems involving multiple interacting variables that are difficult to access, hard to measure, and may change in space or time. Furthermore, the interrelationships between these variables may be indeterminate or at least not yet determined.
There are, of course, computer models that predict singular deterministic events in the natural world. Celestial mechanics provides an example: computer models are commonly used to predict the positions of celestial bodies. As the recent collision of Comet Shoemaker-Levy with Jupiter shows, models in this field are very successful. The location and timing of this collision was predicted to a high degree of accuracy more than a year in advance. One might thus claim that such models can be validated by reference to actual events-and have been. But models in celestial mechanics represent relatively simple physical systems in which the operative forces can be described by a small number of deterministic equations, and in which the variables (e.g., the mass of Jupiter) are measurable constants. Indeed, they are the exception that proves the rule because people have been predicting the positions of the celestial objects for millennia, long before the advent of digital computers. Computer models in celestial mechanics are a matter of convenience, not necessity. Most Scientists, of course, know this at least implicitly, and many modelers will argue that when they use the word validation they do not mean to imply that their model is literally true. They simply mean that it is not evidently false. The modelers have gone through a series of exercises to show that there are no major defects in the model and that they have done their "level best" (41) . Validation, in this view, is a process of confidence building, of building a case for the model (25, 42, 43) . A validated model, therefore, although not true strictly speaking, may be provisionally accepted (44) . These are reasonable claims, hardly likely to provoke profound epistemic discontent, and they are certainly consistent with the first dictionary definition of the word valid: without obvious flaws or defects (45) . From this definition, validation should simply imply the process in which obvious flaws are corrected.
But although these claims are reasonable, they are also problematic. One may remove obvious errors in a model while more subtle ones remain. If validation were merely the process of removing obvious defects, this would scarcely be sufficient for regulatory purposes. Regulatory agencies and the public seek assurance not merely that a model is free of gross error but that it provides a reliable basis for decision making (19, 20, 46) . But to imply that the model provides a reliable basis for decision making is to imply that the model provides an accurate and substantially complete representation of the natural world. This, of course, is how people outside the modeling community interpret validation. In common usage, valid is taken as synonymous with correct, i.e., true, and elsewhere in the dictionary we find precisely that definition: "Valid implies being supported by objective truth" (45) . The disclaimer that scientists know what they mean when they talk about validation would work if the models under discussion were being used solely within the confines of the relevant scientific communities. But very often they are not. Numerical simulation models are increasingly being used, often commissioned, by public agencies whose constituents are not privy to local scientific consensus.
Furthermore, individual scientists may claim that model validation does not imply an assertion about reality (47) , but the official pronouncements of the regulatory agencies for whom they work frequently belie this claim. The Department of Energy, for example, has defined validation as the determination that a "model indeed reflects the behavior of the real world" (48) . The International Atomic Energy Agency (49) has defined a validated model as one that provides a "good representation of the actual processes occurring in a real system." (The use of the word "actual" by the European agency is telling. In the 19th century, the French word actual was borrowed by both English and German scientists as a synonym for real and observable.) Protestations of scientists notwithstanding, it is evident why these regulatory agencies make these claims: Were they to describe validation only as a process of checking for gross error, it would be inadequate as a basis from which to forge political consensus (50 (53) . A notable feature of this case is that the utility companies that owned the plants were effectively shielded from liability for the pollution that their plants had caused because it was the U.S. EPA, not they, that had set the emission limits.
One could, of course, read this decision as implying that had the U.S. EPA validated the model, then the agency would have been blameless despite the model's predictive failure. After all, the action of the court was to order the U.S. EPA to validate the model! From this perspective, the more restricted notion of validation might at first sight appear adequate for regulatory purposes. But this is clearly not quite what the court intended. In the words of the decision, "In order to be useful, a model must accurately predict the 'behavior' of the...system being modeled." The argument of the petitioners against U.S. EPA was that "the model's predictions are not accurate..." (53) . In fact, the U.S. EPA had validated the computer model: it had compared model output to empirical outcomes at four other sites. What the U.S. EPA had not done was test the model at the particular site and subsequently monitor the emissions. The court recognized that testing and monitoring at every site may not be practical-indeed, this is a primary reason for constructing simulation models in the first place-but it remains an open question as to how much site-specific testing and monitoring is required to satisfy legal and community standards. In this regard, scientists have an important role to play in openly discussing the problems and trade-offs involved.
Regulation and legal liability are not the only issues at stake here, nor are they, from a scientific and moral perspective, the most important ones. It may be possible to satisfy the legal standard of acting in a manner that is not arbitrary but fail to satisfy the scientific standard of producing reliable knowledge. Ultimately, the purpose of air pollution controls is to safeguard human health and property and preserve ecosystems. The purpose of the IEUBK model is to prevent new cases of lead poisoning. From this perspective, the issue is not whether the courts will be content with good-faith efforts, the issue is whether the model gives accurate results. In issues of public health and safety, we all have a stake in knowing that decisions made upon the basis of numerical simulation models turn out to be right.
Are Validated Models Valid?
Even if we were to set aside the conceptual issues raised by the example of celestial mechanics and accept the restricted definition of validation, i.e., that a valid model is one without obvious flaws or defects, would it then be possible to say that a given model is valid? The simple answer is no, because even our best models have known flaws. Science motivated by social needs may suffer this problem to a greater extent than science based on questions arising within a disciplinary framework. In the lab, scientists may define a problem in such a way as to rely primarily on areas where databases and conceptual understandings are very rich, and from this core of understanding venture outward toward the less well known. Scientists often refer to this as the well-posed problem. Throughout their history, scientists, both as individuals and as professional communities, have often set aside problems that could not be well posed.
Problems arising from social needs typically are not well posed because the world does not wait for scientific understanding. Where scientists have been asked to make models for use in policy domain, whether the issue is lead poisoning, global climate change, or the safe disposal of radioactive waste, our theoretical understanding and empirical databases are never what we wish them to be. There are always known flaws and defects in large, complex, policy-driven models.
We can think of these flaws as falling into four categories: theoretical, empirical, parametrical, and temporal. Theoretical flaws are the things we do not fully understand or do not have the mathematics to handle. In the case of lead toxicity, this would include, for example, the problem of differential susceptibility and the question of whether there is a safe threshold level of exposure. Empirical flaws are the things we cannot fully or precisely measure. This includes the pragmatic problem of having limited resources with which to measure lead in the environment, and the difficulties of sampling bias and analytical uncertainty, particularly at the very low exposure levels where regulatory limits will be set. Parametrical flaws are the errors introduced when we reduce complex empirical phenomena to It is common to hear in regulatory and scientific circles that public fears are irrational, and there is substantial evidence that public fears are irrational if viewed from a statistical standpoint (54, 55) . But the language of validation does little to assuage such fears. Indeed, it exacerbates them because the public has learned (not without some justification) to be suspicious of reassurances (6, 55) . When There are other ways to talk about the problem. As Hodges and Dewar (29) write, the quality of a model is not equivalent to "agreement of the model with reality." Quality can be evaluated in several ways: on the basis of the underlying scientific principles, on the basis of quantity and quality of input parameters, and on the ability of a model to reproduce independent empirical data. All of these things can be discussed, but none of them should be discussed in either/or terms. Scientists should resist the demand to describe any model, no matter how good, as validated. Rather than talking about strategies for validation, we should be talking about means of evaluation.
That is not to say that language alone will solve our problems, or that the problems of model evaluation are primarily linguistic. The uncertainties inherent in large, complex models will not go away simply because we change the way we talk about them. But that is precisely the point: calling a model validated doesn't make it valid. The language of validation buries uncertainty; as scientists, we should be doing the opposite. We have an obligation to invite open discussion of uncertainties. And the more politically charged the issue at hand, the more essential it is that these uncertainties be articulated clearly, freely, and in language that anyone can understand.
One hundred years ago, Lord Kelvin famously tried to eliminate uncertainty over the age of the earth. Based on the concept of uniformitarianism, the assumption that observable geologic processes are representative of earth history in general, geologists in the late 19th century concluded that the earth was probably a few billion years old. But they had no way to prove it, and efforts to calculate the earth's age precisely had produced numbers as low as 100 million and as high as several hundreds of billions. Kelvin, famous for his penchant for quantitative precision, applied Fourier's theorem of conductive cooling to the question. Assuming that the earth has solidified from an incandescent globe, he obtained a maximum time of 98 million years for it to have cooled to its present surface temperature, and he promptly declared the entire science of geology invalid. Any conceptual scheme that implied a billion-year old earth was fundamentally flawed, he declared. Pursuing the same logic, he dismissed Darwin's theory of natural selection on the grounds of inadequate time for it to operate (61, 62) .
For several decades, Kelvin's more certain result held sway and evolutionists were in nearly full retreat until the discovery of radiogenic heat proved that it was Kelvin rather than the geologists whose conceptualization was faulty. We know now, of course, that the earth is 4.5 billion years old, more than enough time for natural selection to have operated as Darwin envisaged it. Kelvin's calculations, although theoretically valid and highly precise, produced a result inaccurate by a factor of 50. In his desire for certainty, Lord Kelvin made one of the most colossal blunders in the history of modern science. As his infamous mistake clearly shows, the uncontrolled desire for certainty may lead to fallacious quantification and a false sense of security.
